Christian Turner Christian Turner

Enschmittification

At the behest of Corey Yung and Ben Heath on Blue Sky (https://bsky.app/profile/coreyryung.bsky.social/post/3lmftb35eis2p), I put “Enschmittification, a law review article about the ways law and policy in the US are drifting toward Carl Schmitt” into enTalkenator and selected the First Draft template. I haven’t read the resulting draft (just generated it). But here it is; no idea if it’s any good:

Enschmittification

I. Introduction

The ghost of Carl Schmitt haunts contemporary political and legal discourse, an unsettling presence for those committed to liberal democracy. A brilliant and deeply controversial German jurist and political theorist (1888-1985), Schmitt’s penetrating critiques of liberalism, his stark definition of the political, and his theories of sovereignty and the exception have gained renewed, often disquieting, relevance in the twenty-first century. His affiliation with the Nazi regime irrevocably taints his legacy, yet the analytical power of his thought, particularly its capacity to diagnose the vulnerabilities and contradictions within liberal orders, remains undeniable. Scholars, policymakers, and political actors grapple with Schmitt, some finding in his work prescient insights into current crises, others warning of the dangerous allure of his anti-liberal conclusions. His ideas, once relegated to the history of political thought or specialized academic circles, now echo, sometimes faintly, sometimes loudly, in the corridors of power and the public square, demanding our critical attention.

This article introduces the concept of "Enschmittification" to characterize a discernible drift within contemporary American law and policy toward frameworks and logics resonant with Schmitt’s core theories. This is not typically a conscious or acknowledged embrace of Schmittian doctrine; few policymakers explicitly cite The Concept of the Political or Political Theology to justify their actions. Rather, Enschmittification describes a pattern, a convergence of developments wherein the logic of Schmittian thought—its emphasis on existential conflict, decisive sovereign power, and the perceived inadequacies of liberal proceduralism—increasingly shapes legal interpretation, policy justification, and political rhetoric. It manifests as a subtle erosion of established norms, a gradual shift in underlying assumptions about the nature of political conflict, the scope of executive authority, and the value of liberal constitutionalism itself. Recognizing this pattern allows us to analyze disparate phenomena not merely as isolated events, but as potentially interconnected symptoms of a deeper, more systemic transformation.

This article argues that contemporary American law and policy exhibit a discernible pattern of "Enschmittification," evident in the intensifying logic of the friend-enemy distinction, the normalization of executive exceptionalism, and a growing disillusionment with liberal constitutional norms, signaling a significant challenge to traditional democratic principles. We contend that these trends, while arising from complex and multifaceted sources, increasingly align with Schmittian paradigms, pushing the American political and legal system away from its foundational liberal commitments. To substantiate this claim, the analysis will proceed in three parts. Part I, "The Ascendancy of the Friend-Enemy Distinction," will examine Schmitt’s foundational concept of "the political" and trace its manifestations in the hyper-polarization of domestic politics and the framing of national security and foreign policy challenges. Part II, "Sovereignty, the Exception, and Executive Power," will delve into Schmitt’s famous definition of the sovereign as "he who decides on the exception," analyzing the increasing reliance on emergency powers and executive discretion, and the judiciary’s often deferential response. Part III, "The Critique of Liberalism and the Appeal of Decisive Homogeneity," explores Schmitt’s critique of liberal parliamentarism and pluralism, connecting it to the perceived decline of legislative authority, the rise of executive initiative, and the resurgence of nationalist and exclusionary identity politics that implicitly favor homogeneity over liberal diversity. Finally, the Conclusion will synthesize these arguments, reflecting on the profound implications of Enschmittification for American constitutionalism and considering the prospects for resisting this drift.

Part I: The Ascendancy of the Friend-Enemy Distinction

A. Schmitt's Concept of "The Political"

At the heart of Carl Schmitt’s challenge to liberal thought lies his radical and irreducible definition of "the political." In his seminal 1927 essay, The Concept of the Political, Schmitt argues that the specific political distinction, the criterion to which all political actions and motives can ultimately be reduced, is the distinction between friend and enemy. This distinction, he contends, is autonomous, standing alongside other fundamental human antitheses like good and evil in morality, beautiful and ugly in aesthetics, or profitable and unprofitable in economics. It signifies the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation.

Crucially, Schmitt’s concept of the enemy is not metaphorical or symbolic, nor does it refer merely to a private adversary (inimicus) driven by personal antipathy or competition. The political enemy is always the public enemy (hostis), a collective entity – another state, group, or organized force – whose very existence poses an existential threat to one’s own collective way of life. The friend-enemy grouping is therefore the most intense and extreme antagonism, and every concrete antagonism becomes political if it is sufficiently strong to group human beings effectively according to friend and enemy. The enemy is simply "the other, the stranger," and it is sufficient for his nature "that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible."

The political, for Schmitt, is thus defined not by a particular substance – economics, religion, culture – but by the potential intensity of association or dissociation based on this existential distinction. The ultimate possibility inherent in the political is actual physical combat and the willingness to kill and be killed for the sake of preserving one's own form of life against the hostile other. It is the ever-present possibility of conflict, not necessarily its constant actuality, that defines the political sphere. The identification of the enemy is the prerequisite for political existence; the capacity and willingness of a people or political unit to make this distinction is the essence of its political sovereignty and vitality. Schmitt argues forcefully that liberalism, with its emphasis on universalism, individualism, procedure, and compromise, seeks inherently to neutralize or obscure this fundamental political distinction, thereby risking the very political existence it purports to secure. Understanding this stark, conflict-oriented definition of the political is the necessary starting point for recognizing its echoes in contemporary trends.

B. Manifestations in Domestic Political Discourse

The stark logic of Schmitt’s friend-enemy distinction finds increasingly fertile ground in the contemporary American political landscape, particularly evident in the dramatic intensification of partisan polarization. While political disagreement is inherent to democratic life, the current climate often transcends policy disputes or ideological differences, escalating toward a dynamic where opposing political groups view each other not merely as adversaries within a shared constitutional framework (inimici), but as existential threats to the nation itself (hostes). This shift reflects the core Schmittian condition: the perception that the opposing group embodies an alien way of life fundamentally incompatible with one's own, making political engagement less about negotiation and more about demarcation and struggle.

This Enschmittification manifests powerfully in the prevailing political rhetoric. Increasingly, political discourse is characterized by the demonization of opponents. Rather than engaging with the substance of differing views, political actors and commentators frequently resort to language that impugns the motives, loyalty, and even the fundamental legitimacy of those on the other side. Opponents are cast not just as misguided but as corrupt, dangerous, un-American, or actively seeking to undermine the nation's core values or institutions. Such rhetoric moves beyond policy critique into the realm of existential condemnation, framing political affiliation as a primary marker of identity that determines one's status as either friend or enemy to the "true" nation or way of life. This linguistic framing actively constructs the very divisions Schmitt identified as foundational to the political.

Furthermore, this escalating antagonism transforms the nature of policy debates. Where liberal democratic theory envisions deliberation and compromise leading to mutually acceptable, if imperfect, outcomes, the ascendant friend-enemy logic encourages a zero-sum perspective. Policy disagreements are portrayed not as problems to be solved collaboratively but as battles to be won decisively. The possibility of common ground shrinks as the perceived stakes rise to the existential level; compromise becomes suspect, potentially viewed as betrayal or weakness in the face of an implacable foe. Legislative gridlock, performative political conflict, and the increasing difficulty of achieving bipartisan consensus on even widely acknowledged problems can be understood, in part, through this lens. The political arena becomes less a forum for resolving disputes within a shared order and more a battleground where the primary goal is the marginalization or defeat of the opposing collective, mirroring Schmitt’s insistence that the political distinction overrides procedural or normative constraints when conflict reaches sufficient intensity. The very possibility of neutral, mediating institutions or procedures comes under suspicion, echoing Schmitt’s critique of liberalism's attempt to depoliticize fundamental antagonisms.

C. Application in National Security and Foreign Policy

The Schmittian logic of the friend-enemy distinction extends beyond domestic partisan divides, finding perhaps its most explicit and consequential application in the realms of national security and foreign policy. Indeed, Schmitt viewed the capacity to identify and confront the external hostis as the defining characteristic of a sovereign political entity. In contemporary American practice, this framework manifests powerfully in how threats are defined, enemies designated, and policies justified, often prioritizing existential security claims over established legal norms or diplomatic procedures.

The post-9/11 era provides a stark illustration. The declaration of a global "War on Terror" inherently invoked a Schmittian paradigm, defining a diffuse, non-state actor (Al-Qaeda and associated forces) as an existential enemy demanding extraordinary measures. This framing justified policies ranging from preventative military action and indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay to enhanced domestic surveillance powers under the PATRIOT Act and targeted killings via drone strikes. The designation of individuals and groups as "enemy combatants" rather than criminals subject to traditional legal processes explicitly echoes Schmitt’s distinction between the hostis and the inimicus, permitting actions deemed necessary for national survival that might otherwise be legally proscribed. The enemy is conceived not merely as a lawbreaker, but as an entity whose very existence threatens the political community, thus activating the logic of exception and self-preservation.

This logic also permeates contemporary debates surrounding immigration and border security. Increasingly, immigration is framed not solely as a matter of administrative law or economic policy, but as a national security concern. Certain immigrant populations or asylum seekers are rhetorically constructed as potential threats—carriers of crime, terrorism, or alien cultural values corrosive to the national identity. This framing facilitates policies emphasizing militarized border enforcement, expedited removal procedures that curtail due process, and restrictions based on national origin justified by security rationales. By casting specific groups of migrants as fundamentally "other" and potentially hostile, policy discourse shifts toward a friend-enemy logic where exclusion and forceful defense replace integration or humanitarian considerations as the primary objectives. The border becomes less a line demarcating administrative jurisdictions and more a political frontier against perceived existential dangers.

Furthermore, the escalation of economic competition into quasi-existential terms, particularly in relations with strategic rivals like China, reflects a similar dynamic. Trade disputes are often articulated not just as disagreements over tariffs or market access, but as struggles for global dominance implicating national security and the preservation of the American way of life. Intellectual property theft is framed as an attack on national innovation, state-sponsored enterprises as instruments of geopolitical warfare, and technological competition as a zero-sum contest for future supremacy. This securitization of economic relations elevates commercial adversaries toward the status of political enemies, potentially justifying aggressive countermeasures and diminishing the space for diplomatic resolution based on mutual economic interest. In each of these domains—counter-terrorism, immigration, and international economic rivalry—the underlying logic resonates with Schmitt: the identification of an existential enemy serves as the primary justification for political action, often overriding procedural constraints and liberal norms in the perceived service of collective survival.

Part II: Sovereignty, the Exception, and Executive Power

A. The Schmittian Sovereign

Complementing his foundational concept of the political as the friend-enemy distinction, Carl Schmitt offers an equally provocative and influential theory of sovereignty. Departing radically from liberal conceptions that locate sovereignty in the people, the constitution, or the rule of law itself, Schmitt, particularly in his work Political Theology (1922), defines sovereignty through the lens of crisis and decision. His stark formulation encapsulates this view: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." This definition anchors sovereignty not in the everyday functioning of the legal order, but precisely in the moment when that order breaks down or proves inadequate – the state of exception (Ausnahmezustand).

The "exception," for Schmitt, is more than a mere emergency provided for within existing legal frameworks; it signifies a situation of extreme peril, existential threat, or fundamental disorder that cannot be managed through pre-established norms and procedures. It is a borderline case (Grenzbegriff), lying at the edge of the law, where the normal legal system must be suspended to preserve the possibility of order itself. The sovereign, therefore, is the ultimate authority, the specific person or institution possessing the power to recognize that such an exceptional situation exists and, crucially, to decide what must be done about it, potentially operating outside or above the constraints of positive law. This decision is paramount because it determines whether the normal legal order will continue to function or be set aside in the name of political survival or the restoration of stability.

Schmitt's concept challenges the liberal ideal of a government of laws, not men. For him, no legal norm can anticipate or govern the truly exceptional case; the decision on the exception is, by its nature, a decision unconstrained by prior legal standards. The sovereign thus stands paradoxically both inside and outside the legal order: inside, because the ability to declare the exception is a legal competence (even if its content is not legally defined); outside, because the exercise of this power involves suspending the very legal order from which the competence derives. Sovereignty, in this view, is ultimately revealed not in the predictable application of rules, but in the capacity for decisive, potentially unbounded, action when the state’s existence is perceived to be at stake. It is the power to determine when normalcy ends and necessity dictates extra-legal measures, often precisely when the friend-enemy distinction has been invoked to identify an existential threat demanding immediate and forceful response. Understanding this conception of sovereignty as rooted in the decision on the exception is critical for analyzing the contemporary trend toward normalizing emergency powers and expansive executive authority.

B. The Normalization of the State of Exception

The theoretical power of Schmitt’s sovereign—defined by the capacity to decide on the exception—finds a disturbing practical echo in the increasing normalization of exceptional measures within the American political and legal system. While Schmitt conceived of the Ausnahmezustand as a genuine borderline case, a moment demanding the suspension of the normal legal order to preserve the state's existence, contemporary American governance demonstrates a tendency to invoke the logic of exception with greater frequency and for a widening array of perceived crises. What was meant to be the rare deviation is subtly becoming a recurring, almost anticipated, feature of executive action, blurring the line between normalcy and emergency and institutionalizing the very power Schmitt identified as sovereign.

This normalization manifests primarily through the expansive use of emergency powers and executive discretion, often grounded in broad statutory delegations or inherent constitutional authority claims. Since the mid-twentieth century, and accelerating markedly in recent decades, Congress has enacted numerous statutes granting the President significant discretionary powers upon the declaration of a national emergency. While intended to provide flexibility in genuine crises, the sheer number of emergencies declared—many remaining technically in effect for years or decades—suggests a shift from exception to instrument. Presidents have invoked these powers not only in response to sudden attacks or natural disasters but also to address protracted issues like international sanctions enforcement, cybersecurity threats, public health crises (such as the COVID-19 pandemic), and even to pursue policy goals facing legislative opposition, such as funding for border infrastructure. The declaration of an emergency increasingly serves as a mechanism to unlock executive authority, enabling actions that might otherwise require specific legislative approval or face stricter legal constraints.

Furthermore, the reliance on executive orders, presidential proclamations, memoranda, and expansive interpretations of administrative agency rulemaking authority contributes to this trend. Faced with legislative gridlock or seeking to implement policy rapidly and decisively, executives across different administrations have turned to unilateral actions. While such tools have a long history, their contemporary use often pushes the boundaries of delegated authority or constitutional power, effectively creating policy regimes that operate parallel to, or in lieu of, thorough legislative deliberation and enactment. This bypasses the slower, more contested processes of parliamentary debate that Schmitt viewed with suspicion, favoring instead the swift, decisive action characteristic of his sovereign ideal. Whether addressing immigration policy, environmental regulation, economic stimulus, or national security protocols, the resort to executive fiat often carries the implicit justification of necessity or urgency, subtly invoking the spirit of the exception even when a formal state of emergency is not declared. The cumulative effect is a governance landscape where the pathways for exceptional executive action are well-trodden, readily available, and increasingly seen by political actors and segments of the public not as extraordinary deviations, but as standard operational procedures for effective leadership, particularly in perceived times of heightened threat or political stalemate. This practical normalization of exceptional tools represents a significant step towards an operational, if not explicit, embrace of Schmittian sovereignty.

C. Judicial Responses and the Erosion of Constraints

The normalization of exceptional executive power, as discussed above, inevitably implicates the third branch of government. The judiciary, within the American system of separated powers, is traditionally conceived as a crucial check on executive overreach, safeguarding constitutional limits and individual rights even, or perhaps especially, during times of perceived crisis. However, the judiciary’s response to the increasing invocation of exceptionalism and the expansion of executive authority has been complex and often characterized by significant deference, thereby contributing, sometimes inadvertently, to the erosion of meaningful constraints and subtly reinforcing the operational logic of the Schmittian sovereign.

Historically, and particularly in matters touching upon national security, foreign affairs, and emergency powers, federal courts have frequently deferred to the political branches, especially the executive. Doctrines such as the political question doctrine, which deems certain issues non-justiciable as they are constitutionally committed to other branches, the state secrets privilege, which allows the executive to withhold evidence deemed harmful to national security, and a general tendency towards deference in interpreting the scope of executive powers in these areas, have often limited the judiciary’s ability or willingness to intervene robustly. When confronted with executive actions justified by claims of necessity, emergency, or inherent presidential authority to protect the nation—precisely the terrain of Schmitt’s exception—courts have often hesitated to substitute their judgment for that of the branch ostensibly possessing greater expertise and constitutional responsibility for national defense and foreign relations. This deference, while sometimes rooted in constitutional principles of separation of powers, can effectively insulate executive decisions on the scope and nature of the exception from rigorous legal scrutiny, mirroring Schmitt’s assertion that the decision on the exception fundamentally precedes, and can suspend, the normal legal order.

While the judiciary has not been entirely passive, moments of significant judicial resistance often appear as outliers or face subsequent limitations. Landmark cases following the 9/11 attacks, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (affirming the right of a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy combatant to due process) and Boumediene v. Bush (extending the privilege of habeas corpus to detainees at Guantanamo Bay), represented notable attempts to assert judicial authority and impose constitutional constraints on executive power exercised under the banner of national security exceptionalism. Yet, even these victories for constitutional limits have faced challenges in implementation, legislative pushback, and subsequent judicial interpretations that have narrowed their practical impact. Furthermore, the sheer volume of executive actions taken under claims of emergency or inherent authority, many of which never face judicial review due to standing issues, timing, or the aforementioned deference doctrines, means that the overall trend favors an expanding zone of executive discretion where the power to effectively "decide on the exception" rests largely unchecked.

The cumulative effect of this pattern—marked by frequent deference punctuated by occasional, sometimes circumscribed, judicial intervention—is a gradual weakening of the legal and constitutional barriers designed to contain executive power during crises. It fosters an environment where the executive branch anticipates a degree of judicial latitude when invoking necessity or emergency, further encouraging reliance on unilateral action. This dynamic does not necessarily reflect a conscious judicial embrace of Schmittian theory, but its practical consequence aligns with Schmitt’s critique of liberal legalism’s inability to effectively bind the sovereign decision in moments of existential gravity. By often stepping back precisely when the executive declares the normal rules insufficient, the judiciary can appear to validate the premise that the decision on the exception, and the actions flowing from it, reside fundamentally outside the ordinary constraints of law, thereby contributing to the broader pattern of Enschmittification within the American constitutional structure.

Part III: The Critique of Liberalism and the Appeal of Decisive Homogeneity

A. Schmitt's Critique of Liberal Parliamentarism and Pluralism

Flowing logically from his insistence on the primacy of the friend-enemy distinction and the necessity of sovereign decision in the exception, Carl Schmitt mounted a sustained and trenchant critique of the core institutions and values of liberal democracy. His skepticism was directed particularly at parliamentarism, pluralism, and the liberal emphasis on proceduralism and individual rights, which he viewed not as strengths ensuring stability and freedom, but as fundamental weaknesses that rendered the liberal state indecisive, vulnerable, and ultimately incapable of performing its essential political function: guaranteeing security against existential threats. For Schmitt, the very features that liberals celebrate—open discussion, compromise, protection of minority views, and the dispersal of power—were dangerous illusions that masked deeper conflicts and paralyzed the state precisely when clear-sighted, unified action was most required.

Schmitt’s critique of parliamentarism, most notably articulated in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1923), centered on what he perceived as its inherent contradictions and ultimate futility. He argued that the historical justification for parliament—rational deliberation among independent representatives seeking truth or the common good through open debate—had become a fiction in the age of mass democracy and organized interests. Parliaments, in his view, were no longer sites of genuine discussion aimed at persuasion but arenas for negotiation between predetermined party interests, dominated by bureaucratic maneuvering and propaganda. The endless talk (Diskussion) characteristic of liberal assemblies served, he believed, merely to delay or obstruct necessary decisions, obscuring the locus of real power and failing to generate the unified political will required to confront serious challenges. Liberalism's reliance on procedure and perpetual debate, Schmitt contended, actively undermined the capacity for decisive leadership and swift action, fostering instability rather than resolving conflict.

Parallel to his attack on parliamentarism was Schmitt’s deep suspicion of liberal pluralism. The liberal ideal of a society composed of diverse individuals and autonomous groups pursuing their varied interests under a neutral state framework was, for Schmitt, a recipe for political dissolution. He argued that genuine political unity—essential for distinguishing friend from enemy and acting decisively—requires a substantial degree of homogeneity among the people (demos). Pluralism, by legitimizing and even encouraging internal divisions based on economic interests, religious beliefs, or cultural identities, fractured this necessary unity. It threatened to turn the state into a mere "pluralistic party-state" (pluralistischer Parteienstaat), a battleground for competing factions incapable of asserting a common identity or collective will against external or internal enemies. Schmitt viewed the liberal state's neutrality towards these internal divisions not as tolerance but as weakness, an abdication of the political task of maintaining order and defining the boundaries of the political community.

Furthermore, Schmitt saw the liberal emphasis on universal norms, the rule of law (Rechtsstaat), and fundamental individual rights as mechanisms designed to constrain and ultimately negate the political itself. By attempting to subject sovereign power to abstract legal principles and protect the individual even against the perceived needs of the collective, liberalism sought to neutralize the friend-enemy antagonism and subordinate the potentially unbound decision on the exception to predictable rules. This, in Schmitt’s analysis, was a dangerous naiveté, ignoring the reality that law ultimately rests on a prior political decision and that, in moments of existential crisis, the preservation of the political entity must take precedence over legal formalities or individual claims. True democracy, for Schmitt, was not found in liberal procedures or the protection of universal rights, but in the identity between the rulers and the ruled, grounded in the substantive homogeneity of the people and their capacity to express a unified acclamation, affirming their collective existence and distinguishing themselves decisively from the 'other'. This critique of liberalism’s core tenets as sources of weakness and indecision provides a crucial framework for understanding contemporary trends that seem to implicitly favor homogeneity and decisive authority over deliberation and diversity.

B. The Decline of Deliberative Democracy and Legislative Authority

Schmitt’s trenchant critique of liberal parliamentarism as an ineffective relic, incapable of decisive action and fractured by competing interests, finds a powerful, if unwelcome, resonance in the contemporary American experience. The perceived and often actual paralysis of the United States Congress stands as a stark counterpoint to the liberal ideal of efficient, deliberative lawmaking. Persistent legislative gridlock, fueled by intense partisan polarization (itself reflecting the friend-enemy dynamics discussed in Part I), has rendered the passage of significant, widely agreed-upon legislation increasingly difficult. Budgetary standoffs, filibusters obstructing majority action in the Senate, and the transformation of committee work from substantive policy development into platforms for partisan messaging contribute to a pervasive sense of institutional failure. This legislative inertia aligns disturbingly well with Schmitt’s diagnosis: the mechanisms designed for deliberation and compromise appear, in practice, to impede the formation of a unified political will and the capacity for effective governance, especially on contentious issues.

This perceived failure of the legislative branch does not occur in a vacuum. It directly fuels the shift of policy-making initiative and effective power toward the executive branch and the administrative state—a trend already examined through the lens of exceptionalism in Part II. Faced with congressional inaction, Presidents increasingly resort to executive orders, regulatory actions, and administrative guidance to implement their policy agendas. While often justified on grounds of necessity or efficiency, this circumvention of the legislative process implicitly validates Schmitt’s skepticism about parliamentary efficacy. The executive, capable of acting with relative speed and unity (at least in appearance), comes to be seen—by proponents and often by a frustrated public—as the only truly effective locus of governmental power, the entity capable of the decisive action that the deliberative body seems unable to muster. The expansion of the administrative state, while complex, further contributes to this dynamic, as agencies wield significant quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power, often responding more directly to executive priorities than to intricate legislative mandates born of compromise.

Critically, this dynamic is reinforced by growing public disillusionment with the processes of deliberative democracy itself. Widespread frustration with political deadlock, coupled with the constant amplification of conflict through media ecosystems, can erode public faith in the value of parliamentary debate, negotiation, and incrementalism. In such a climate, the appeal of decisive leadership—a leader or executive perceived as willing to cut through procedural niceties and partisan squabbling to "get things done"—can become potent. This popular sentiment echoes Schmitt’s preference for acclamation and decisive authority over the perceived endless and unproductive talk of liberal assemblies. The demand is less for adherence to process and more for tangible results and the assertion of clear direction, particularly in perceived moments of crisis or deep societal division. This public appetite, born of frustration with perceived legislative impotence, creates a receptive environment for political actors who emphasize strength, decisiveness, and action over deliberation, compromise, and procedural regularity, thereby furthering the subtle drift away from core liberal-democratic legislative norms and towards a more Schmittian conception of effective political power centered on executive decision.

C. Resurgent Nationalism and the Politics of Identity

The erosion of faith in deliberative processes and the perceived impotence of established legislative bodies, as discussed previously, create a political vacuum readily filled by appeals to more elemental forms of collective identity. When the procedural mechanisms of liberalism appear incapable of forging consensus or addressing perceived crises, the allure of unity grounded in substantive likeness—in shared culture, history, or ethnicity—grows stronger. This contemporary resurgence of nationalism and exclusionary identity politics resonates deeply with Carl Schmitt’s insistence on the necessity of homogeneity (Artgleichheit) as the foundation for genuine political community and decisive action. It represents perhaps the most visceral manifestation of Enschmittification, directly challenging the pluralistic premises of American liberal democracy.

Schmitt fundamentally distrusted the liberal capacity to manage difference. He argued that a functioning democracy requires not just procedural agreement but a substantive identity between the rulers and the ruled, predicated on a shared understanding of who "the people" (demos) are. This homogeneity, for Schmitt, was the necessary precondition for recognizing common interests, generating collective will, and, crucially, distinguishing the political community from the alien "other"—the enemy. Liberalism's celebration of pluralism and protection of minority rights, in his view, risked dissolving this essential unity, rendering the state vulnerable to internal fragmentation and external threats. The contemporary rise of political movements emphasizing national identity, often defined in cultural, ethnic, or religious terms, implicitly or explicitly embraces this Schmittian logic. They posit a "true" national community, bound by shared heritage or values, against which internal dissenters or external influences (immigrants, globalist ideologies, cultural shifts) are measured and often found wanting, potentially designated as threats to the nation’s core identity.

This politics of identity functions as an alternative source of political energy and legitimation, operating outside the channels of traditional liberal deliberation. Appeals to "take our country back," defend "our way of life," or preserve a specific cultural or demographic makeup serve to mobilize a political base by constructing a sense of shared identity under siege. This inherently involves drawing boundaries—defining who belongs and who does not, who is part of the authentic "we" and who represents the threatening "them." This dynamic mirrors Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction, but transposed onto the terrain of cultural and national identity within the domestic sphere. Policy proposals—ranging from restrictive immigration laws and challenges to multiculturalism, to educational curricula debates emphasizing national narratives and skepticism towards international institutions—can be understood as attempts to enforce or restore a perceived homogeneity deemed essential for national cohesion and strength.

Furthermore, this emphasis on substantive identity over liberal procedure provides a powerful justification for decisive, even illiberal, action. If the primary goal is the preservation of the nation’s perceived core identity, then procedural constraints, minority rights, or the principles of universalism may be seen as obstacles to be overcome in the name of collective self-preservation. Leaders who articulate and champion this vision of homogeneous identity can claim a form of democratic legitimacy rooted in popular acclamation by the "true people," bypassing the perceived failures of parliamentary representation and challenging the neutrality of liberal institutions. This trend represents a profound departure from the American constitutional tradition's aspiration, however imperfectly realized, to forge unity out of diversity through shared allegiance to laws and principles rather than demanding substantive similarity. The resurgent appeal of decisive homogeneity, echoing Schmitt's critique of liberalism, thus constitutes a critical element in the broader pattern of Enschmittification, signaling a potential shift away from pluralistic democracy towards a more exclusionary and potentially authoritarian form of political order.

Conclusion

A. Synthesizing the Evidence of Enschmittification

This article has traced a disturbing pattern within contemporary American law and policy, identifying a convergence toward logics and frameworks resonant with the political and legal theories of Carl Schmitt—a phenomenon termed "Enschmittification." The analysis reveals that this is not merely a series of isolated incidents or rhetorical flourishes but a more systemic drift affecting core aspects of governance and political culture. We have seen how the foundational Schmittian concept of the political, defined by the existential distinction between friend and enemy, increasingly animates domestic partisan warfare and shapes the justification for national security and foreign policy actions, prioritizing demarcation and conflict over negotiation and legal regularity (Part I). Concurrently, the Schmittian definition of sovereignty finds its echo in the normalization of the state of exception, marked by an expanding reliance on executive emergency powers and unilateral decision-making that often bypasses or marginalizes legislative deliberation and faces only intermittent constraint from a frequently deferential judiciary (Part II). Finally, this drift is underpinned and reinforced by a growing disillusionment with the core tenets of liberal democracy itself—its deliberative processes, its pluralism, its procedural constraints—manifesting in the perceived decline of legislative authority and the resurgent appeal of decisive leadership grounded in nationalist appeals and the exclusionary politics of identity, echoing Schmitt's critique of liberalism and his preference for substantive homogeneity (Part III). These threads—the intensification of enmity, the normalization of exceptional power, and the turn toward decisive homogeneity—are intertwined, mutually reinforcing elements of the broader Enschmittification trend.

B. Implications for American Constitutionalism

The implications of this Enschmittification for American constitutional democracy are profound and deeply troubling. At its heart, the drift toward Schmittian paradigms constitutes a fundamental challenge to the principles upon which the American political and legal order has traditionally, if imperfectly, been based. The ascendance of the friend-enemy logic corrodes the possibility of civic trust and reasoned deliberation across political divides, transforming adversaries into existential threats and undermining the very premise of a shared constitutional project. The normalization of executive exceptionalism directly threatens the separation of powers, eroding legislative authority and weakening judicial checks, thereby concentrating power in a manner antithetical to constitutional design and risking the arbitrary suspension of the rule of law in the name of necessity. Furthermore, the critique of liberal pluralism and the concomitant appeal of substantive homogeneity attack the foundations of individual rights and equal protection, replacing the ideal of unity forged through adherence to law and principle with a potentially exclusionary unity based on shared identity, inherently marginalizing dissent and difference. Taken together, Enschmittification points toward an erosion of faith in—and the practical efficacy of—the core liberal commitments to limited government, procedural fairness, protected individual freedoms, and the management of pluralism through democratic institutions. It signals a potential trajectory away from a government of laws and toward a regime where political will, decisive action, and the perceived demands of collective survival or identity take precedence over established constitutional norms.

C. Prospects and Counter-Movements

Recognizing the pattern of Enschmittification is not to declare the inevitable triumph of Schmittian logic within the American system, nor is it to suggest that all actors exhibiting these tendencies are conscious disciples of Schmitt. History is not predetermined, and political trajectories can shift. Yet, the evidence presented suggests a significant and worrisome vulnerability within contemporary American constitutionalism, an environment where the critiques and alternatives posed by Schmitt find increasing, albeit often implicit, purchase. The allure of decisiveness in times of perceived crisis, the mobilizing power of identity politics grounded in enmity, and the frustration with perceived liberal institutional failures create fertile ground for this drift to continue, potentially accelerating if left unaddressed. Countering this trend requires more than simply identifying its symptoms; it demands a robust and deliberate reaffirmation of the foundational principles of liberal constitutional democracy. This involves not only defending the institutions of separated powers, the rule of law, and fundamental rights, but also revitalizing the practices of deliberation, compromise, and mutual respect that underpin a functioning pluralistic society. It requires resisting the temptation to frame political differences in existential terms and insisting on the accountability of executive power even, and especially, in times of emergency. Ultimately, the contest against Enschmittification is a contest for the soul of American democracy itself—a reminder that the preservation of liberal constitutionalism is not a given, but an ongoing political and intellectual task demanding vigilance, courage, and a renewed commitment to its often challenging, yet indispensable, ideals.

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